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EVIDENCE
STATUS OF THE JONES BRIGHT-LINE TEST FOR PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF GRAPHIC PHOTOS
In the death penalty appeal of Ellis Franklin, the South Carolina Supreme
Court examined the procedures for using a Batson' peremptory challenge and
the admissibility of graphic pictorial evidence. The court in State v. Franklin2
held that the trial judge properly (1) disallowed defense counsel's peremptory
strike of a member of the second jury panel who had previously been
unconstitutionally stricken and (2) admitted graphic photographs into evidence
because their probative value outweighed any possible prejudicial effect.'
Franklin renders ineffective the bright-line test put forth in State v. Jones4 by
reinterpreting the proper procedure to be followed for a Batson challenge.5
This leaves unscathed South Carolina's long-standing rule regarding the
discretion afforded a trial judge in admitting evidence.6
Ellis Franklin was convicted of murdering Jennifer Martin and, upon the
jury's finding of aggravating circumstances, 7 sentenced to death. 8 During jury
selection, the defendant filed a Batson motion in response to the prosecution's
striking of a black, female juror. In turn the prosecution made a similar
motion in response to the defense's striking of three white males and a white
female. 9 One of the white males was juror Cantley.1° The trial court
sustained both motions and quashed the jury panel to begin selection de novo
in accordance with Jones." The new venire included all those previously
stricken. 2 Juror Cantley was called a second time, and again, defense
counsel attempted to strike juror Cantley. The judge, however, disallowed the
1. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
2. __ S.C. _, 456 S.E.2d 357 (1995).
3. Id. at , _, 456 S.E.2d at 357, 361. Franklin has already been cited as support for
the admission of such evidence. State v. Kelley, _ S.C. _, 460 S.E.2d 368, 371 (1995)
(admitting charts, photographs, and video depicting excessive nature of killing).
4. 293 S.C. 54, 358 S.E.2d 701 (1987).
5. Franklin, __ S.C. at _, 456 S.E.2d at 364 (Finney, J., dissenting).
6. E.g., State v. Kelley, __ S.C. _, , 460 S.E.2d 368,370 (1995); State v. Alexander,
303 S.C. 377, 380, 401 S.E.2d 146, 148 (1991).
7. Aggravating circumstances include murder while in the commission of physical torture.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(l)(h) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
8. Franklin, __ S.C. at __, 456 S.E.2d at 358.
9. Id. at 456 S.E.2d at 359.
10. Id. at , 456 S.E.2d at 363 (Finney, J., dissenting).
11. Id. at 456 S.E.2d at 360.
12. Id. at , 456 S.E.2d at 359.
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strike and seated Cantley without allowing defense counsel to restate a race
neutral explanation.' 3 Franklin objected claiming error. 4
In the sentencing phase of this bifurcated proceeding, the prosecution
admitted into evidence seventeen photographs and ten slides to establish the
aggravated circumstance of murder while in the commission of physical
torture.'5 This evidence depicted the crime scene and Martin's tortured body
at autopsy as well as the instruments of torture. Franklin claimed these
photographs and slides, particularly State's exhibits 40 and 90,16 were overly
prejudicial.' 7 A pathologist testified regarding these exhibits and the alleged
torture." On finding that the previously stricken juror had been properly
seated and that the photographic evidence was not so prejudicial as to warrant
inadmissibility, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed Franklin's
conviction and sentence.'9
I. BATSON, JONES, AND PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES IN SOUTH CAROLINA
The Supreme Court decided in Batson v. Kentucky20 that the Equal
Protection Clause2' forbids the striking of potential jurors solely because of
race. 2 In Batson a black man was convicted of second-degree burglary and
receipt of stolen goods. The Court held that to make a prima facie case of
discrimination, a defendant must show that he is a member of a distinct racial
group, that the prosecution has used peremptory challenges to remove jurors
of his race, and that the circumstances raise an inference that these removals
were indeed on account of race.' The burden then shifts to the prosecution
to provide a race-neutral explanation for the strike. 4 The Court, however,
13. Id. at, 456 S.E.2d at 364 (Finney, I., dissenting).
14. Record at 1378.
15. Franklin, __ S.C. at _, 456 S.E.2d at 361.
16. Exhibit 40 was a close-up shot of Martin's badly-beaten face with her eyes rolled back
and her teeth turned backwards. Exhibit 90 depicted the body's genital area with part of a
broomstick (that had allegedly been used to torture the victim) beneath the buttocks. Id. at _,
456 S.E.2d at 361.
17. Franklin, S.C. at _, 456 S.E.2d at 361.
18. Id. at 456 S.E.2d at 362.
19. Id. at 456 S.E.2d at 361, 362.
20. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
22. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
23. See id. at 97.
24. Id. at 97-98. Deference is given to trial judges regarding the making out of such a prima
facie case of discrimination. The defendant, however, must ultimately show that this race-neutral
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EVIDENCE
left the question of how to implement Batson to the state and federal trial
courts. The principles proffered in Batson have since been widely expand-
ed. The Supreme Court has further held that one cannot strike a juror solely
on the basis of gender,26 and a Batson challenge can now be made against the
defense as well as the prosecution.27 The principle has even been extended
to include civil litigants as well as parties to a criminal action.2"
The South Carolina Supreme Court has consistently looked to the
procedure for Batson challenges outlined in State v. Jones.29 The Jones court
noted that although the United States Supreme Court gave state trial courts the
discretion to fashion their own remedies in Batson situations, a better course
of action would be to lay down a precise manner of inquiry into such
accusations.3" Thus, the court opted to dispense with Batson's case-by-case
analysis and set forth a bright-line test by which, if the defendant is the
member of a cognizable racial group and the prosecutor exercises strikes to
remove jurors of that race, a hearing will be held at the request of defense
counsel. If the solicitor fails to give a racially neutral explanation, "the process
of selecting the jury shall start de novo." 3' In State v. Franklin the South
Carolina Supreme Court attempted to follow the procedural guidelines outlined
in Jones. The majority maintained, however, that the issue in Franklin was not
squarely addressed in Jones.3 2 In essence, the court treated this issue as a
case of first impression for South Carolina. In Franklin the court sought the
appropriate procedure to be used when a party attempts to strike from the
second jury panel a person previously ruled unconstitutionally stricken under
Batson. Citing decisions from such states as New York,33 Mississippi,34
Florida,35 and Missouri, 36 the majority contended that most jurisdictions find
no error in the seating of previously stricken jurors.37 The court further
25. Id. at 99. In South Carolina this procedure is established in State v. Jones, 293 S.C. 54,
358 S.E.2d 701 (1987).
26. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
27. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
28. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
29. 293 S.C. at 58, 358 S.E.2d at 703-04.
30. Id. at 57, 358 S.E.2d at 703.
31. Id. at 58, 358 S.E.2d at 704.
32. Franklin, _ S.C. at _, 456 S.E.2d at 359 ("Jones, however, did not address the
procedure when, as here, a party attempts to strike from the second venire a person previously
ruled stricken in violation of Batson.").
33. People v. Moten, 603 N.Y.S.2d 940 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993).
34. Griffin v. State, 610 So. 2d 354 (Miss. 1992).
35. State v. Aldret, 606 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1992); Jefferson v. State, 595 So. 2d 38 (Fla.
1992).
36. State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403 (Mo. 1993).
37. Franklin,__ S.C. at __ & n.4, 456 S.E.2d at 360 & n.4. There is evidence of some
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stipulated that a contrary finding would inevitably reward a party for an
improper, even discriminatory, strike with a different jury panel to choose
from." This being an unacceptable outcome, the court deemed the seating of
Cantley proper.39
The majority further supported its position by adding that peremptory
challenges have never been considered "constitutionally protected fundamental
rights";40 thus, a trial judge has the right to fashion an appropriate remedy
under a particular fact pattern as long as the right to a fair trial and an
impartial jury is not violated."
Justice Toal, writing for the majority, insisted that no infringement of
rights existed under the facts presented.42 Justice Toal maintained that the
jury selection process was started anew in accordance with Jones and that
144 (N.C. 1993); California, People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978); and Indiana,
Minnifield v. State, 539 N.E.2d 464 (Ind. 1989), favor striking the entire panel upon finding
discriminatory peremptory strikes. States that do call for the seating of improperly removed jurors
do not have a distinct procedure outlined by their relative state supreme courts as South Carolina
does under State v. Jones, 293 S.C. 54, 358 S.E.2d 701 (1987).
38. Franklin,__ S.C. at _, 456 S.E.2d at 360 (quoting People v. Moten, 603 N.Y.S.2d
940, 947 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993)).
39. Id. at _, 456 S.E.2d at 361.
40. Id. at__, 456 S.E.2d at 360 (quoting Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992)).
Yet, it has long been noted that "[tjhe right of challenge, as allowed, is regarded sacred." State
v. Briggs, 27 S.C. 80, 86, 2 S.E. 854, 857 (1887). Moreover, the United States Supreme Court
has even called these peremptory strikes "one of the most important of the rights secured to the
accused." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107 (1986) (quoting Pointer v. United States, 151
U.S. 396, 408 (1894)). Ourjustice systems affords great weight to the proposition that all parties
deserve a fair trial and an impartial jury under the United States Constitution. The Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ensures "essential demands of fairness." Ham v. South
Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 526 (1973) (quoting Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 310
(1931)). In fact, long before the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a fair trial was made applicable
to the states, courts had often noted that this right to an impartial jury was a basic facet of our
justice system. Id. at 531 (Marshall, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (citing Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)). The use of peremptory challenges, though not to be abused
with discriminatory practices, is one of the few means of ensuring this impartiality and fairness.
Thus, in protecting jurors from discriminatory removal from jury participation, parties must have
the means to assure the fairest treatment afforded under the law. For this reason, jury strikes
should be handled with the utmost care. As the South Carolina Supreme Court stated in State v.
Briggs, 27 S.C. 80, 2 S.E. 854 (1887) (new trial ordered in murder case from reversible error
in jury selection):
The law casts its protection over all persons alike. Hence, before any person can be
made to suffer for a crime ... he must be proceeded against step by step according
to the rules of practice which the law has ordained. It is no avail to proceed against
him according to other and better rules. The law's rules must be pursued, or the law's
penalty cannot be imposed upon him for his crime.
Id. at 84-85, 2 S.E. at 856.
41. Franklin, __ S.C. at _, 456 S.E.2d at 360.
42. Id. at _, 456 S.E.2d at 360.
[Vol. 48
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there was no indication in the record of any new race-neutral reason for the
strike.43 In fact, she added that defense counsel "conceded" to this lack of
new facts." Justice Finney, however, disagreed; in his dissent, he contended
such a concession was not clear from the record.4' The majority apparently
made this assertion based upon statements made not by the attorney at trial,
but by appellate counsel during oral argument. Even from these statements at
appeal, however, such a concession is not apparent.46 The majority may well
have concluded that it was simply unnecessary to allow defense counsel to
reargue his jury challenge.47
Although State v. Jones did not directly address the dominant Batson issue
involved in Franklin;48 as the Finney dissent contended, the majority may
have misapplied the reasoning of Jones.49 The purpose of the Jones doctrine
was to develop a bright-line test rather than to allow the trial courts to fashion
43. Id. at _, 456 S.E.2d at 360.
44. Id. at _, 456 S.E.2d at 361.
45. Id. at__, 456 S.E.2d at 364 (Finney, J., dissenting); see also Record at 1359-60, 1377-
78.
46. JUSTICE 2: Was there any indication of an opportunity being afforded to
articulate any basis that the second strike as to why juror Cantley would not
be an acceptable juror to the defense? ATTORNEY: The trial court wouldn't
allow anything. He just said...
JUSTICE 2: What did the trial court say?
ATTORNEY: He just said, "I'm not going to allow you to do it for any
reason."
JUSTICE 2: "I have previously ruled."
And, when it comes up the second time, if something had
developed, was counsel afforded an opportunity to give that reason? Say this
juror had been observed talking to a police officer or any number of things
that happen in the trial of cases, was he given an opportunity to give a
reason?
ATTORNEY: No. And I think he had a right to give that reason.
JUSTICE 1: You yourself, however, concede that the reason the juror was
struck is because he struck him before. You don't know of any other reason
or anything in this record to suggest that defense counsel was prevented if
he knew of some extraneous reason that cropped up between first selection
and a half an hour later, the second selection, you don't know of any other
reason that developed for that strike? Do you, Attorney?
ATTORNEY: No, your Honor, I don't.
Franklin, _ S.C. at _, 456 S.E.2d at 365 (Appendix (quoting audio recording of oral
arguments)).
47. Id. at _, 456 S.E.2d at 360 (citing Steele v. Charlotte, Columbia & Augusta R.R., 14
S.C. 324 (1880) (a motion formerly heard and ruled upon would only be reviewed if a new set
of facts were to arise)).
48. Supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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case-by-case results."0 By allowing a trial court to develop its own remedy,
the usefulness of the bright-line test utterly disappears."
The procedure outlined in Jones was binding on the Franklin court absent
a dramatic decision to overturn Jones. Jones requires that the jury selection
process start de novo.5 ' Thus, the process should have been treated just as
if it was being done for the first time. The Franklin majority contended that
it followed the mechanics of Jones; 3 however, in not allowing defense
counsel the right to express a race-neutral explanation of his attempted jury
strike, 4 the court was using beliefs and information from the original jury
selection process rather than starting this process completely de novo as
outlined in Jones. When defense counsel struck juror Cantley, the judge
interjected, "I've already ruled." The juror was seated, and the judge stated
that the defense did not have the right to reiterate a race-neutral explana-
tion.5 The trial judge added to the record: "My idea was that if he did not
have a reason then he couldn't have a reason now."5 6 Thus, the "rules of
practice which the law has ordained"" in South Carolina were not followed
to the letter. The bright-line Jones remedy, if not completely overturned as
Justice Finney asserted," is certainly tainted by the court's decision.
I1. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF GRAPHIC EVIDENCE IN SOUTH CAROLINA
Franklin contested the admission of certain graphic photographs and
slides, claiming they were unduly prejudicial and without probative value
because his attorney, in declining cross-examination, left the pathologist's
testimony uncontroverted.59 Justice Toal and the majority of the South
Carolina Supreme Court disagreed,' finding that such evidence, despite its
graphic depiction, has continually been held relevant in the establishment of
50. State v. Jones, 293 S.C. 54, 57, 358 S.E.2d 701, 703 (1987).
51. Franklin, - S.C. at _, 456 S.E.2d at 364 (Finney, J., dissenting) ("The majority
overrules Jones' bright line remedy and substitutes for it the vague rule . . ").
52. "[A]new; afresh; second time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 435 (6th ed. 1990).
53. Franklin, __ S.C. at _, 456 S.E.2d at 360 ("Our decision today does not impact
Jones.").
54. Supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text; see Record at 1377-78 (Judge stating: "I ruled
at the side bar that he did not have the right to again give me some race neutral reason.").
55. Record at 1359.
56. Id. at 1378.
57. State v. Briggs, 27 S.C. 80, 85, 2 S.E.2d 854, 856 (1887).
58. Franklin, - S.C. at _, 456 S.E.2d at 364 (Finney, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at _, 456 S.E.2d at 361-62.
60. Id at-, 456 S.E.2d at 362; cf. id. at_, 456 S.E.2d at 364-65 (Finney, J., dissenting)
(calling for at least a resentencing).
(Vol. 48
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aggravating circumstances under section 16-3-20 of the South Carolina
Code.6'
South Carolina has adopted the language of Rule 403 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, which provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice . "..."62 Unfair prejudice has been interpreted by the South
Carolina Supreme Court as "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one."63
Furthermore, South Carolina has long adhered to the principle that "[t]he
trial judge is given broad discretion in ruling on questions concerning the
relevancy of evidence, and his decision will be reversed only if there is a clear
abuse of discretion."'I The Fourth Circuit maintains that a probative versus
prejudicial determination of the trial court "will not be overturned except
under the most 'extraordinary' of circumstances."' Thus, the court in
Franklin was obliged to follow the trial court's ruling on the admission of this
evidence, namely exhibits 40 and 90, unless it could be shown that the judge
had blatantly abused his discretion. Rule 403's presumption of admissibility
paired with the trial judge's justifications based on statutory provisions
regarding the aggravating circumstance of physical torture made abuse of
discretion an unlikely result.'
Section 16-3-20 allows the admission of "additional evidence in
extenuation, mitigation, or aggravation of the punishment" in the sentencing
phase of a bifurcated trial.67 Thus, although photographs that tend to arouse
the sympathies of a jury should be largely excluded in the guilt phase of a
capital trial,6" such evidence can often be admitted in the sentencing phase
to establish aggravating circumstances. For example, in State v. Kornah-
rens,69 another capital murder case, the supreme court held that the admission
into evidence of photographs and slides of the gravesite and bodies would most
61. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); see State v. Green, 301 S.C. 347,
358, 392 S.E.2d 157, 162 (1990) (admission of evidence of prior crimes allowed in sentencing
phase to prove "extenuation, mitigation or aggravation of the punishment").
62. S.C. R. EVID. 403.
63. State v. Alexander, 303 S.C. 377, 382, 401 S.E.2d 146, 149 (1991) (quoting FED. R.
EVID. 403 advisory committee's note).
64. Id. at 380, 401 S.E.2d at 148 (citing State v. Jeffcoat, 279 S.C. 167, 303 S.E.2d 855
(1983)); see, e.g., State v. Kelley, _ S.C. _, _,460 S.E.2d 368, 370 (1995) (citing State
v. Kornahrens, 290 S.C. 281, 350 S.E.2d 180 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940 (1987)).
65. United States v. Heyward, 729 F.2d 297, 301 n.2 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Whitfield, 715 F.2d 145, 147 (4th Cir. 1983).
66. Franklin, - S.C. at _, 456 S.E.2d at 361-62.
67. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
68. State v. Middleton, 288 S.C. 21, 24, 339 S.E.2d 692, 693 (1986); State v. Waitus, 224
S.C. 12, 27-28, 77 S.E.2d 256, 263 (1953).
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likely have been inadmissable in the guilt phase, but they were properly
admitted in the sentencing phase.7" In Kornahrens the pictures showed the
bodies in substantially the same condition as the defendant had left them, and
thus, were relevant in the sentencing phase to establish the circumstances of
the crime and the defendant's character. The court added that although a trial
judge must always weigh the probative value of evidence against its prejudicial
effect, the probative value in the sentencing phase of a capital trial is much
broader than that in the guilt phase.7'
Given this broad interpretation of probative value in the sentencing phase
of a bifurcated trial, how graphic can photographs be before they constitute
undue prejudice under South Carolina evidentiary rule 403?72 South Carolina
apparently leaves the relevancy of particular factors largely to a case-by-case
determination affording much discretion to the trial judge. Certain factors do,
however, seem to have some special weight in this determination of prejudice.
For example, color photographs showing "a considerable amount of blood"
were deemed inadmissable absent a need to show some material fact yet to be
established.73 Photographs in which the bodies are shown in the same
condition as the defendant left them are seen as not unduly prejudicial. The
court in Kornahrens stated that "[w]hile not pleasant to look at, they show
what the defendant himself did to the bodies and nothing more."' By
comparison, pictures depicting a victim after the body had been altered
somehow have been found to be unduly prejudicial when they contained no
disputed information. In State v. Middleton75 the supreme court found that the
prejudicial value of a picture depicting the scalp pulled away from the victim's
skull and another showing her surgically opened vaginal cavity outweighed any
probative value they added to the prosecution's case.
Another important factor for South Carolina courts in weighing prejudicial
effect and probative value is whether the information depicted in the graphic
pictures is in any way contested. Defense counsel in Franklin argued that
exhibits 40 and 90 had little probative value because the trial attorney did not
cross examine the pathologist whose testimony established the same informa-
tion as was contained in these photographs and slides.76 Defense counsel
claimed that this lack of a cross examination left the pathologist's testimony
uncontroverted and, therefore, the photographs were essentially unnecessary.
The South Carolina Supreme Court disagreed, contending that the jury could
70. Id. at 288, 350 S.E.2d at 185.
71. Id.
72. S.C. R. EvID. 403.
73. State v. Patrick, 289 S.C. 301, 308-09, 345 S.E.2d 481, 485 (1986) (per curiam),
overruled on other grounds by Casey v. State, 305 S.C. 445, 409 S.E.2d 391 (1991).
74. Kornahrens, 290 S.C. at 289, 350 S.E.2d at 186.
75. 288 S.C. 21, 24, 339 S.E.2d 692, 693 (1986).
76. Franklin, __ S.C. at _, 456 S.E.2d at 362.
[Vol. 48
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not have understood the extent of the torture solely from the pathologist's
statements. 7 When courts find that information could have or already has
been established through other testimony or evidence, such photographs have
at times been found overly prejudicial. In Middleton, the court reversed a
murder conviction, finding that the testimony of a forensic pathologist had
negated much of the probative value of the extremely graphic photographs and
slides. There, in contrast to Franklin, defense counsel did not merely refuse
to cross examine the expert, but further offered to stipulate to any of the facts
shown in the pictures.79
Other jurisdictions have taken additional factors into consideration in this
balancing test. The necessity of the evidence is commonly an important
consideration.8" In fact, the advisory committee notes to Rule 403 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, from which the South Carolina rule is taken,"
adds that "[tihe availability of other means of proof may also be an appropri-
ate factor." 2 This consideration has been emphasized sparingly, however, in
the establishment of aggravating circumstances.8 3 Furthermore, graphic
evidence merely corroborating a witness's testimony already proffered at trial
has been allowed when the reliability of the witness may be questionable.'I
In State v. Henniss' the North Carolina Supreme Court framed a "test
for excess" to be used in the weighing of graphic photographic evidence. In
this test, courts are to focus on the following three factors: (1) whether a
picture unduly reiterates evidence already presented, (2) whether irrelevant
portions of a photograph obscured the more relevant portions, and (3) whether
"the totality of the circumstances composing [the] presentation" requires
exclusion.86 Hennis further calls for the weighing of such factors as the
choice of medium, size of the image, amount of detail shown, and whether the
77. Id. at _, 456 S.E.2d at 362.
78. Middleton, 288 S.C. at 24, 339 S.E.2d at 693.
79. Id.; see State v. Waitus, 224 S.C. 12, 77 S.E.2d 256, 263 (1953) (admission of
photographs of murder victim was reversible error when all information was fully established by
uncontradicted medical and lay testimony).
80. Gross v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., 695 F.2d 858, 863 (5th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Grassi, 602 F.2d 1192, 1195 (5th Cir. 1979) (a "central consideration[]" in determining
probative value under Rule 403 is proponent's need for the evidence).
81. "VALTER A. REISER JR., A COMPARISON OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE WITH
SOUTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE LAW 16-17 (5th ed. 1993) (quoting State v. Alexander, 303 S.C.
377, 401 S.E.2d 146 (1991)).
82. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee notes; see, e.g., State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60
(Utah 1983).
83. See State v. Todd, 290 S.C. 212, 214, 349 S.E.2d 339, 340 (1986) ("no abuse of
discretion if the photograph serves to corroborate testimony").
84. People v. Gardner, 151 Cal. Rptr. 123, 127 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
85. 372 S.E.2d 523 (N.C. 1988).
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image is in color or black and white.87 North Carolina courts have further
stated that "photographs showing the condition of the body when found, the
location where found and the surrounding conditions at the time the body was
found" are properly admissible.88
Although similar factors have been applied in South Carolina cases, no
clear checklist can be ascertained. In most states, South Carolina included, the
discretion of the trial judge dictates the Rule 403 balancing analysis. The
above-mentioned factors, however, certainly should be noted, and defense
counsel should be sure to file appropriate pretrial motions pushing aggressively
for stringent limits on the number and presentation of graphic photographs or
slides to ensure possibly prejudicial evidence is only admitted to illustrate
material facts. Furthermore, defense counsel should be ready to object to any
facets of the evidence that could serve only to heighten prejudicial effect. Any
display manipulation such as "unconventionally placed screens, excessive
magnification, [or] skillful accumulation" may be deemed suspect and unduly
prejudicial, requiring exclusion.89
Ansley Brooks Askins
87. Id.; see also State v. Banks, 564 S.W.2d 947, 951 (Tenn. 1978) ("accuracy and clarity"
of pictures and "inadequacy of testimonial evidence in relating the facts to the jury" were factors
considered to determine that the illustrative value outweighed the inflammatory effect of
evidence).
88. State v. Atkinson, 167 S.E.2d 241, 255 (N.C.), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 948
(1971).
89. Michael T. Cawley, Note, North Carolina's "Test For Excess": The Prejudicial Use of
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